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Voucher Systems of Public Education Mter Nyquist and 
Sloan: Can a Constitutional System Be Devised? 
Criticism of the present system of American elementary and sec-
ondary education has rekindled interest in the idea, first proposed 
by Adam Smith,1 of providing parents with vouchers to purchase 
their children's education. The basic elements of a voucher plan are 
simple. Parents are given vouchers worth roughly the per pupil cost 
1. A. SMrrH, Tm: WEALTH OF NATIONS 7!16-!18 (Mod. Lib. ed. 19117). 
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of education in their city. These vouchers can be used to purchase 
education at any public or private school that meets the accredita• 
tion requirements imposed by the state.2 Such a system would in-
crease the ability of parents and children to choose among various 
options in the education market, a result that may, in turn, lead to 
greater responsiveness by schools to the demands of education con-
sumers, to greater satisfaction on the part of a community with its 
educational system, and to the increased tailoring of specific educa-
tional programs to individual needs. 3 
Critics of the voucher system have used two lines of attack. First, 
they argue that the use of the voucher system would destroy public 
schools by encouraging the growth of an extensive private school 
system, would deepen divisions between various segments of society, 
and would encourage the formation of fly-by-night schools.4 Second, 
they claim that many forms of the voucher system would be uncon-
stitutional. For instance, they warn that a voucher system could re-
sult in increased racial segregation.6 I£ the racial segregation problem 
were solved by including controls over the admissions processes of 
the schools involved, 6 a thornier problem would still exist with re-
gard to public financing of parochial schools. In June 1973, Pennsyl-
vania and New York programs that aided parochial schools and that 
were similar to a voucher system in many respects were ruled uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court because they violated the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment.7 A voucher program that will 
be implemented in New Hampshire in September 1974 excludes 
sectarian schools, but it is threatened with a suit charging that it 
will therefore burden the free exercise of religion and violate the 
first amendment.8 Thus, any voucher system, whether it includes or 
excludes parochial schools, may be threatened by challenges based 
on the first amendment. 
Most commentators now conclude that the establishment and free 
exercise clauses of the first amendment are, as the Supreme Court has 
said, "correlative and coextensive ideas, representing only different 
2. Areen, Education Vouchers, 6 HARV. CIV. R.IGHTS·CIV. LIB. L. REv. 466, 468·69 
(1971). 
3. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, EDUCATION VOUCHERS: A REPORT ON 
FINANCING ELEMENTARY EDUCATION BY GRANTS TO PARENTS 1-6 (1970); l\f. FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 91-94 (1962). 
4. These criticisms are summarized in Areen, supra note 2, at 469-70. 
5. See discussion of this problem in id. at 477-91. 
6. The ramifications of this suggestion are explored in id. at 490. 
7. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (Pennsylvania); Committee for Pub. Educ. &: 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,413 U.S. 756 (1973) (New York). These cases are discussed 
more fully at notes 39-53 infra and accompanying text. 
8. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1973, § I, at 64, col. I (late city ed.). 
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facets of the single great and fundamental freedom.''9 While the 
commentators have emphasized different aspects of this freedom,10 
"[t]he general principle deducible from the First Amendment and 
all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate 
either governmentally established religion or governmental interfer-
ence with religion."11 
One explanation of this general principle is known as "strict neu-
trality." The religion clauses "should be read as stating a single pre-
cept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action 
or inaction because these clauses, read together as they should be, 
prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit 
or to impose a burden."12 Illustratively, a statutory classification un-
der which a state funds public schools but does not fund private 
schools would be permissible. However, if a state were to aid pri-
vate schools, a classification in terms of sectarian and nonsectarian 
private schools would be impermissible.13 
While, at one time, the Supreme Court seemed to be shifting 
toward accepting strict neutrality,14 the Court's opinions now appear 
9. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Com-
mentators urging that the religion clauses state a unitary principle include: P. KURLAND, 
RELIGION AND THE LAW 111-12 (1962); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 135-39 
(rev. ed. 1967); E. SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 331-33 (1972); Schwarz, 
No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 692-93 
(1968). 
Others who have read the religion clauses as stating a unitary principle in the sense 
that the two clauses must be read together and their contending principles balanced 
state that the establishment clause should be given less weight than the free exercise 
clause. Such commentators include: Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, 
and Doctrinal Deuelopment. Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
1381, 1389 (1967); Katz, The Case for Religious Liberty, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 95, 97 
a. Cogley ed. 1958); Murray, Law OT Prepossessions'!, 14 LAW 8: CoNTEMP. PROB. 23, 32 
(1949). 
10. For instance, separation of church and state was the focus of emphasis in 
L. PFEFFER, supra note 9, at 727. Other commentators have emphasized the religious 
liberty aspect of the first amendment. See, e.g., E. SMITH, REr.tCious LIBERTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1972). 
11. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). 
12. P. KURLAND, supra note 9, at 112. 
13. See id. at 82. 
14. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Deuelopment. 
Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. R.Ev. 513, 515 (1968). 
The last vestige of the strict neutrality theory is Justice Harlan's opinion, concurring 
in the result, in Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 694-700 (1970). The Walz decision 
upheld a New York statute that exempted church property from property taxes. Justice 
Harlan grounded his concurrence on the idea that churches were simply given the same 
exemption that was extended to other nonprofit organizations. Such a scheme did 
not require that religion be used as a basis for classification; therefore, the requirements 
of the strict neutrality theory were met. See Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MtCH. L. REv. 179, 198 (1970). 
Justice Harlan's advocacy of the strict neutrality theory may have been due more 
\ 
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to reflect an "accommodation" theory. This theory "recognizes that 
there are necessary interrelationships between government and re-
ligion, that the government cannot be indifferent to religion in 
American life, and that, far from being hostile or even neutral, it 
may accommodate its institutions and its programs to the religious 
interests of the people."15 The state "accommodates" religious inter-
ests when it tr~ats religious institutions in the same manner in which 
it treats comparable secular institutions-for example, when it pro-
vides police and fire protection to churches. rn However, it also "ac-
commodates" them when it gives preferential treatment to religious 
interests in order to promote religious liberty-for example, when it 
exempts churches from property taxes.17 Whatever the form of the 
accommodation at stake, the Constitution may either require or pro-
hibit a state from providing for religious-interests.18 In addition, the 
Court's decisions recognize a zone of discretion in which states can 
act to establish a proper balance among the competing considera-
tions of the religion clauses if they choose to do so.10 
to his belief in judicial restraint than to his belief in the intrinsic merit of tltat theory. 
In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court required South Carolina to make 
an exception to the provision of its unemployment compensation laws that denied un• 
employment benefits to a person who refused to work on Saturday. Such an exception 
was necessary to accommodate the religious beliefs of the appellant. Justice Harlan 
dissented: "It has been suggested that such singling out of religious conduct may vio• 
late the constitutional limitations on state action •••• My own view, however, is tltat 
at least under the circumstances of this case it would be a permissible accommodation 
of religion for the State, if it chose to do so, to create an exception to its eligibility 
requirements for persons like the appellant." 374 U.S. at 422 (emphasis original), 
15. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE C0NSTITU110N 69 (1964). Other commentators that 
have stressed the various aspects of accommodation are mentioned in notes 16-17 infra. 
16. Professor Giannella refers to this type of accommodation in Giannella, supra 
note 14, at 519 ("[R]eligious associations operate in the temporal realm and accordingly 
can be legitimately included among the beneficiaries of the prevailing order established 
and sustained by the state.''). This form of accommodation is also supported in Schwarz, 
supra note 9, at 693 (The establishment clause "should be read to prohibit only aid 
which has as its motive or substantial effect the imposition of religious belief or prac• 
tice.''), 723 ("[A]id which does not have the effect of inducing religious belief, but 
merely accommodates or implements an independent religious choice, does not increase 
the danger of religion and, since it does not offend the value of parental choice, docs 
not violate the no-imposition standard.'). 
17. See Giannella, supra note 9, at 1389 ("[T]he Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner 
(374 U.S. 398 (1963)] held that the state must make special provisions to relieve religious 
liberty from restrictions imposed by generally legitimate governmental regulations.'); 
Katz, Radiations from Church Tax Exemption, 1970 SUP, CT, REv. 93, 102 ("With a 
neutrality interpretation, tbe Establishment Clause permits special provisions for re• 
ligion ••. .'); Kauper, supra note 14, at 197 (Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the 
majority opinion in Walz v. Tax Commn., .397 U.S. 664 (1970), in which the tax exemp-
tions were upheld, asserted that the e.xemptions were consistent with the state's neutral 
stand toward religion, "but his (Burger's] is the neutrality of accommodation and a 
neutrality which, by according a central place to religious liberty, permits a preferential 
treatment for religion.'). 
18. P. KAUPER, supra note 15, at 77. 
19. That there is such a zone of discretion was made clear in ·walz v. Tax Commn., 
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To determine whether an accommodation is required, permitted, 
or prohibited, the courts must engage in a pragmatic appraisal and 
reconciliation of various interests.20 The most important of these are, 
of course, the interests that underlie the religion clauses.21 
A major purpose of the religion clauses is to guarantee that states 
neither encourage nor discourage participation in religious life. For 
the sake of convenience, this concept will be referred to as "volun-
tarism.''22 One aspect of voluntarism is the concern ·with freedom of 
conscience generally associated with the free exercise clause;23 volun-
tarism guarantees in<:Iividual freedom to believe and to express that 
belief.24 Direct restraints on belief and worship, and the imposition 
of civil disabilities because of religious affiliation were two of the 
evils against which the first amendment was directed.25 
Voluntarism also dictates that the growth and advancement of a 
religious sect come from the voluntary support of its membership. 
Thus, it is an infringement of religious liberty to compel people to 
pay taxes to support religious activities or institutions.26 The senti-
ment that led to the adoption of the first amendment was in part a 
reaction against the taxes that the colonies exacted for church 
support.27 
397 U.S. 664 (1970): "The limits of permissible state .accommodation to religion are by 
no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." 
397 U.S. at 673. "Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for 
play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exer-
cise to exist without sponsorship and without interference." 397 U.S. at 669. 
20. P. KAuPER, supra note 15, at 69. Other commentators who believe that the Court 
should use a balancing process to determine what the first amendment permits include: 
Schwarz, supra note 9, at 734; Valente, Aid to Church Related Education-New Direc-
tions Without Dogma, 55 VA. L. REv. 579, 614 (1969). Professor Giannella suggests that 
a restricted balancing approach be used for cases concerned with required accommoda-
tions, Giannella, supra note 9, at 1384-85, but criticizes the broad balancing test sug-
gested by Professor Kauper as giving the Court too much discretion, Giannella, supra 
note 14, at 531. A similar criticisin of the broad balancing test is made in Choper, The 
Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260, 323-25 (1968). 
21. See P. KAuPER, supra note 15, at 76-77; Schwarz, supra note 9, at 734-37; Valente, 
supra note 20, at 614. The restrictions that Professor Giannella would put on a restricted 
balancing approach for cases concerned with required accommodation are de_termined 
by the values underlying the religion clauses: "[I']he Court, in giving content to the 
first amendment, should attempt to incorporate the human purposes and values under-
lying it." Giannella, supra note 9, at 1384. 
22. The term "voluntarism" was used in this manner in Justice Harlan's opinion, 
concurring in the result, in Walz: "This legislation neither encourages nor discourages 
participation in religious life and thus satisfies the voluntarism requirement of the First 
Amendment." Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970). The term was also used 
in this manner in Giannella, sµpra note 14, at 517. 
23. Giannella, supra note 14, at 517. 
24. P. KAUPER, supra note 15, at 13. 
25. Giannella, supra note 9, at 1386. 
26. P. KAuPER, supra note 15, at 14. 
27. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9-14 (1947). 
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A second major purpose of the religion clauses may be referred 
to as political noninvolvement: Religious differences should be kept 
out of politics; religious pressures and interfaith dissension should 
play no part in the political process.28 One aspect of political non-
involveµient is the requirement that state governments show no trace 
of ecclesiastical influence. This aspect was reflected in Epperson v. 
' Arkansas,29 in which the Supreme Court invalidated an Arkansas 
statute that forbade the teaching of evolutionary theory in public 
schools. The ground for decision was that a state government should 
not manipulate the curriculum in public schools to sanction a par-
ticular religious belief.so 
Political noninvolvement also requires that churches not be sub-
ject to state control.81 This aspect most often comes into play when 
government bodies attach strings to financial aid to sectarian institu-
tions. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,82 the Court struck down programs 
through which Rhode Island and Pennsylvania helped pay the 
salaries of teachers hired by sectarian schools to teacl,i secular sub-
jects. The Court found that the surveillance of the teachers' work 
and the audit of financial records that would be required to ensure 
that state moneys were not spent on sectarian functions would result 
in excessive governmental entanglement with church affairs.88 In 
essence, these tasks would lead the state to force its mm definition of 
religion on the sectarian schools.84 
Finally, the political noninvolvement principle seeks to avoid po• 
litical strife over religion.35 The first two aspects of the principle 
relate to this goal, but it has an independent force. For example, in 
Committee of Public Education &- Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,80 
where a program of aid to sectarian schools was held to be unconsti-
tutional, the Court based its decision on, among other things, a fear 
that the annual appropriations that the program would require 
would lead to annual political contention between religious groups.117 
While the values underlying the religion clauses often dictate 
that a state may not grant a benefit to a religious group, a state is 
frequently permitted or required to protect religious liberty by giv-
28. Giannella, supra note 14, at 517. 
29. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
30. Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presb1•terian Church 
Case, 1969 SUP. CT. REv. 347, 347. 
31. Id. 
32. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
33. 403 U.S. at 620-22. 
34. See 403 U.S. at 620. 
35. Giannella, supra note 14, at 517. But see Schwarz, supra note 9, at 710-11. 
36. 41!! U.S. 756 (1973), 
37. 413 U.S. at 794-98. 
March 1974] Notes 901 
ing religious interests equal or preferential treatment. A full voucher 
system-that is, one in which both secular and sectarian schools par-
ticipate-raises the question of whether such an accommodation to 
religious interests is permitted. If the accommodation is permitted, 
a full voucher system is within a state's zone of discretion.38 On the 
other hand, a partial voucher system-one in which only secular 
schools participate-raises the question whether, if a state decides to 
use a voucher system; it is required to include sectarian schools. 
I. A FULL VOUCHER SYSTEM 
' 
In the recent cases of Committee for Public Education & Re-
ligious Liberty v. Nyquist89 and Sloan v. Lemon,40 the Supreme 
Court struck down tuition grant programs in New York (Nyquist) 
and Pennsylvania (Sloan). The tuition grant plans provided for par-
tial tuition reimbursements to many41 parents who sent their chil-
dren to nonpublic schools. Under these programs, as under a full 
voucher system, the states provided money to parents of schoolchil-
dren, and the funds were ultimately contributed to sectarian schools. 
The New York plan also provided tax credits for any parent whose 
child attended a nonpublic school and who was not eligible for a 
tuition grant.42 This provision was also struck down. 
The Court found that the purpose of the programs-to enhance 
the quality of education-was secular.43 However, it also found that 
the tuition grant programs and the tax credit program, in effect, con-
stituted direct aid to sectarian schools. The fact that the aid was 
given, not directly to the schools, but to the parents, was favorable to 
its constitutionality, but the Court said that that fact was only one 
of many to be considered.44 More significant was the fact that the aid 
was not restricted to the purely secular activities of the schools. Fo-
cusing on the general nature of the aid, the Court distinguished46 
the forms of support-state provision of bus fares and textbooks to 
parents of all school children, including parents of those in parochial 
schools-that had been found to be constitutional in Everson v. 
Board of Education46 and Board of Education v. Allen.47 The tuition 
38. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
39. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
40. 413 U.S. 825 (1973). 
41. In New York the subsidy was only to parents with incomes under 5000 dollars. 
42. The New York plan is described in 413 U.S. at 762-68. The Pennsylvania plan 
is described in 413 U.S. at 828-31. 
43. 413 U.S. at 772; 413 U.S. at 829-30. 
44. 413 U.S. at 781. 
45. 413 U.S. at 780-83; 413 U.S. at 832-33. 
46. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
47. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
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grants in New York and Pennsylvania could be used to pay for 
both the religious and the secular aspects of the educational process. 
In contrast, the bus rides in Everson had no inherent religious sig-
nificance, and the state in Allen48 did not authorize the loan of re-
ligious books. 
This factor alone, however, should not be sufficient to distinguish 
Everson and Allen. While, in those cases, the functions aided were, 
superficially, separate from the sectarian functions of church schools, 
economic realities make the distinction meaningless. The tax money 
that paid for bus fares and textbooks necessarily freed money that 
would othenvise have been spent for those items. This money could 
now be spent on other, more religious-oriented, aspects of the chil-
dren's education.49 
The Court's distinction on the ground that there is no unconsti-
tutional direct aid to religious functions if such functions are 
supported solely as a result of aid to secular functions that frees other-
wise unavailable funds50 can best be explained by the presence of 
other .first amendment values in Nyquist and Sloan. In effect, the aid 
in those cases constituted a special benefit to a special class-a class 
defined on the basis of religious beliefs. The special benefit was that, 
48. 392 U.S. at 244. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in part and dissenting in part 
in Nyquist, found this distinction irrelevant: "There are at present many forms of gov-
ernment assistance to individuals that can be used to serve religious ends, such as social 
security benefits or 'G. I. Bill' payments, which are not subject to nonreligious-use re-
strictions. Yet, I certainly doubt that today's majority would hold those statutes uncon• 
stitutional under the Establishment Clause." 413 U.S. at 804, Furthermore, in Quick 
Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), the Court delivered an opinion in which such a 
distinction was not made. In Quick Bear, members of the Sioux Indian Tribe, for whom 
trust and treaty funds were set aside by the federal government in order to provide for 
education, were able to elect to attend religious schools. The Court refused to issue an 
injunction against the disbursement of public money to those schools. 
Justice Powell believed that Quick Bear could be distinguished on the ground that 
that case did not involve the distribution of public, tax-raised funds. "The funds that 
were utilized by the Indians to provide sectarian education were treaty and trust funds 
which the Court emphasized belonged to the Indians as payment for the cession of 
Indian land and other rights." 143 U.S. at 781 n.37. 
Justice Powell also distinguished the use' at sectarian schools of aid provided by tlie 
G.I. Bill. The essence of the distinction was that the G.I. Bill provides aid for a wide 
range of students, most of ,vhom do not attend sectarian schools, while most of the 
beneficiaries under the New York (and Pennsylvania) tuition grant programs were peo-
ple whose children attended sectarian schools. 413 U.S. at 782·83 n.38. Furtlicrmore, 
there arc significant differences benveen the religious aspects of church-related institu• 
tions of higher learning, where the G.I. Bill benefits are used, and those of parochial 
elementary and secondary schools, toward which the benefits of the tuition grant pro• 
grams were directed. 413 U.S. at 777 n.32. 
49. Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1, 172 (1971), 
50. The Court said that the aid from tuition grants "is quite unlike the sort of 'in• 
direct' and 'incidental' benefits that flowed to sectarian schools" in Everson and Allen, 
Sloan, 413 U.S. at 832. "In the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the 
state aid derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and 
nonideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is 
invalid." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780. 
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in addition to the right they already had to send their children to 
public schools, parents of children attending private schools were 
also given the grant money.51 While the tuition grants and the tax. 
credit were theoretically available to all who sent their children to 
private schools, they were in fact given to a special class consisting of 
members of the Roman Catholic faith, since Catholics were, by far, 
the primary users of nonpublic schools.52 
The special benefit in Nyquist and Sloan was also considered 
suspect in that it might tend to create political strife along religious 
lines.li3 Since the program that aided sectarian schools was separate 
from the financing of public schools, annual appropriations decisions 
concerning each program could lead to religious partisanship. 
. Any aid to religious functions is suspect because it tends to en-
courage religion.54 However, if the aid is given to religious interests 
merely as part of a program aiding a broader class of beneficiaries, 
the problem of encouragement should be ameliorated by the fact 
that a denial of aid to religious interests alone would tend to inhibit 
religion. The aid in Nyquist and Sloan, in effect, conferred a special 
benefit only on religious interests, so that there was no such amelio-
rating factor. 
In contrast to Nyquist and Sloan, the Court in Walz v. Tax 
Commission55 upheld the constitutionality of a property tax. exemp-
tion for religious institutions. The exemption, granted by the New 
York City Tax Commission "to religious organizations for religious 
properties used solely for religious worship," was part of a larger tax. 
exemption program for religious, educational, and charitable institu-
tions. 56 The reasons for upholding the exemption were consistent 
with both the voluntarism and the political noninvolvement pur-
poses of the first amendment. They included: the long history of 
such exemptions;57 the fact that the exemption decreased, rather 
than expanded, the entanglement of the state with religious institu-
tions;68 the aid the exemption gave to state efforts to avoid hostili~y 
51. "The grants to parents of private schoolchildren are given in addition to the 
right that they have to send their children to public schools 'totally at state expense.'" 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38. "The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a 
special economic benefit. Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as 
an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or as a reward for 
having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is to preserve and support religion-
oriented institutions.'' Sloan, 413 U.S. at 832. 
52. See 413 U.S. at 768, 774, 780; 413 U.S. at 830. 
53. See 413 U.S. at 794-98; 413 U.S. at 828, 830. 
54. Cf., e.g., Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970); 397 U.S. at 710-11 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
55. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
56. 397 U.S. at 666. 
57. 397 U.S. at 677. 
58. 397 U.S. at 674. 
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to religion;59 the fact that tax exemptions are qualitatively different 
from grants of money, since grants require the government to trans-
fer part of its revenue to churches, while tax exemptions merely 
involve the government's abstention from demands that the church 
support the state;60 and the fact that the aid given through tax ex-
emptions was not limited to religious organizations, but, rather, was 
given to a broad range of beneficiaries.01 
A full voucher system will be able to avoid the special treatment 
pitfall if the monetary value of the voucher is high enough. If it is, 
parents who do not belong to a religious denomination that already 
supports a system of sectarian schools or who do not choose to send 
their children to sectarian schools may want to use the vouchers at 
nonsectarian private schools and, in response to this demand, many 
new private schools may be able to come into existence. In that case, 
the state voucher system would not benefit a predominantly religious 
class but would offer realistic private educational alternatives to all 
its citizens. 62 
There would still be one serious problem with a full voucher 
system. In such a system, the class of beneficiaries would be broad-
as they were in the systems ruled constitutional in Everson and Allen 
-but the benefits would not be restricted to the secular side of the 
institutions. This latter factor-not present in Everson and Allen-
seemed critical to the ruling in Nyquist and Sloan that the programs 
under consideration were unconstitutional. But, in Nyquist, Justice 
Powell explicitly left open the question of whether the failure to 
restrict the aid to the secular side would, in itself, invalidate a 
voucher-type system: 
Because of the manner in which we have resolved the tuition 
grant issue, we need not decide whether the significantly religious 
59. 397 U.S. at 673. 
60. 397 U.S. at 675. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, also distinguished 
tax exemptio!1s and general subsidies, saying that most tax exemptions constitute a 
mere passive state involvement with religion. 397 U.S. at 690-91. 
61. 397 U.S. at 670-72. The property tax exemptions applied to nonprofit, quasi• 
public corporations that fostered moral or mental improvement. These included hos-
pitals, libraries, playgrounds, and scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups. 
In Justice Harlan's opinion, which concurred in the result, the broad range of bene• 
ficiaries was the prime factor supporting the constitutionality of the property tax ex-
emption: 
The statute which implements New York's constitutional provision for tax ex• 
emptions to religious organizations has defined a class of nontaxable entities whose 
common denominator is their nonprofit pursuit of activities devoted to cultural 
and moral improvement and the doing of "good works" . . • . 
To the extent that religious institutions sponsor the secular activities tlmt this 
legislation is designed to promote, it is consistent with neutrality to grant them an 
exempt!on just as other organizations devoting resources to these projects receive 
exemptions. 
397 U.S. at 696-97. 
62. Casenote, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1081, 1090 n.62 (1973). 
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character of the statute's beneficiaries might differentiate the present 
cases from a case involving some form of public assistance (e.g., 
scholarships) made available generally without regard to the sec-
tarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution 
benefitted. 63 
To determine whether the lack of a specially benefitted religious class 
should be sufficient to cause a full voucher system to be held consti-
tutional, 64 the purposes and values of the first amendment must be 
examined. 
The aspect of voluntarism that stresses free individual choice in 
religion poses no barrier to the creation of a full voucher system. 
Allowing a parent to choose among a variety of options in deciding 
where his child should go to school restrains no one's religious be-
liefs. In fact, the voucher system is more compatible with freedom of 
individual belief than is a public school system. 65 If state support is 
provided only to public schools, all parents have a financial incentive 
to send their children to those schools, even though many of them 
may feel that they have a religious obligation to educate their chil-
dren in parochial schools. The existing system is, thus, arguably hos-
tile to religious interests in that it forces certain taxpayers to bear a 
double financial burden-tuition, as well as taxes that support pub-
lic education-if they are to educate their children as their religious 
beliefs require. A voucher system would allow parents to choose to 
send their children to sectarian schools without compelling them to 
incur additional expenses. 
The existing system is also arguably hostile to religion in that it 
encourages parents to send their children to schools where teachers 
will tend to transmit values that conform to the values of those who 
control the public school system. There will be variety among teach-
63. 413 U.S. at 782-83 n.38. Later in this opinion Justice Powell made a similar com-
ment: "Without intimating whether this factor alone might have controlling significance 
in another context in some future case, it should be apparent that in terms of the po-
tential divisiveness of any legislative measure the narrowness of the benefitted class 
would be an important factor." 413 U.S. at 794. 
64. In some cases, the Court has allowed or required preferential treatment of re-
ligious interests where that has been necessary in order to reconcile the competing values 
underlying the first amendment. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the encour-
agement-a released-time program in which the state allowed children at public schools 
to attend religious instruction conducted off the school premises-was so minimal that 
it fell within the state's zone of discretion. The preferential treatments in Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), were necessary 
to prevent the state from inhibiting religion. See note 91 infra. The aid in Walz en-
abled the state to avoid entangling itself in church affairs; granting the tax exemption 
also allowed the state to avoid placing itself in the role of a potential oppressor in 
collecting taxes and prevented the state from discouraging the practice of religion by 
granting benefits -only to nonreligious nonprofit institutions. See text accompanying 
notes 55-61 supra. 
65. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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ers, but the system as a whole must make some value choices: The 
selection of textbooks on a system-wide basis will tend to transmit 
certain perspectives, especially in such areas as history, literature, 
and the social sciences; the choice of methods of accommodating re-
ligion, such as released-time programs or Christmas programs, will 
tend to transmit certain judgments on the importance of religion 
and on the relative importance of different religions; and the choice 
between a progressive and a traditional educational system will tend 
to transmit a certain view as to the relative value of a life-style that 
prizes emotional experience and creativity as opposed to one that 
stresses self-discipline. Certainly, a public school system can attempt 
to provide variety in its programs, but such attempts will be limited 
because of expense and because the majority of the electorate in any 
school district will usually insist that its values be dominant. A full 
voucher system may provide alternatives for parents who disagree 
with the majority's values that necessarily dominate any school dis-
trict. 
The other aspect of the voluntarism purpose concerns state sup-
port of sectarian institutions. While states are permitted to make 
some accommodations to religious interests, other accommodations, 
such as providing certain churches with support from tax revenues, 
are not permitted.66 Accommodations involving economic aid are the 
most suspect. 67 Nevertheless, all economic aid to religious interests 
is not precluded.68 Rather, a preclusion of religious interests from 
financial benefits provided by the government to society at large 
could constitute governmental hostility to religion.00 
66. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970). 
67. A comparison of Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 806 (1952), and Illinois ex rel. 
Mccollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), is illustrative. Both cases concerned 
whether released-time programs for religious education were permitted under the first 
amendment. The released-time program in Zorach, in which religious instruction took 
place away from the public school building, was upheld; the program in .McCollum, in 
which the religious instruction took place within the public school building, was struck 
down. The most obvious difference between the two cases is that in McCollum the state 
was providing economic aid to religious interests in the form of imputed rent, while in 
Zorach the state did no more than change school schedules to accommodate religious 
interests. ' 
68. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973), and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 
(1971), illustrate the Court's method of determining what is a permissible accommoda-
tion to religion where a state wishes to treat religious institutions in the same manner 
in which it treats comparable secular institutions. How the Court determines what 
constitutes a permissible accommodation to religion when religion is to receive preferen-
tial treatment is demonstrated by Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664 (1970), discussed 
in text accompanying notes 55-61 supra, and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), 
discussed in note 67 supra. 
69. "In short, making religious voluntarism a reality requires that religious associa-
tions be treated with political equality and accorded civil opportunities for self-develop-
ment on a par with other voluntary associations. For instance, to deprive churches of 
police and fire protection-because the state would be aiding religion in violation of 
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Where a parent would otherwise refrain from sending his child 
to sectarian schools because of the economic burden, a full voucher 
system may provide an economic incentive to use private parochial 
schools.70 However, the fact that a parent incidentally receives such 
an incentive from a plan designed to benefit all children does not, in 
itself, violate the first amendment. The total program must be ana-
lyzed. The school-financing scheme must not unduly encourage re-
ligious education, but it also must not discourage it. Treating re-
ligious groups in the same way that similar secular groups are 
treated will usually meet both those requirements. If the value of the 
vouchers is high enough, no special treatment should exist. 
One requirement of the political noninvolvement principle is 
that churches not be subject to state control.71 In school aid cases, 
this problem has generally been dealt with under the rubric of en-
tanglement.72 A full voucher system need cause no impermissible 
entanglement. The state plays a role in regulating sectarian schools 
for such purposes as accreditation and fire inspection, even when no 
financial aid is provided.73 State financing of sectarian schools 
through vouchers to parents would present even less serious prob-
lems, since such a system would require no church-state contact.74 
A voucher system that did not require state money to be spent 
strictly on secular functions would not require state surveillance of 
teachers, as did the system in Lemon, nor would it involve the state 
in the role of telling churches what constitutes a religious function. 
Another aspect of the political noninvolvement principle is the 
avoidance of political strife along religious lines.75 In Nyquist, Jus-
tice Powell expressed the fear that the tax programs involved might 
cause political divisions along religious lines and that the consequent 
the establishment clause-would be insupportable doctrine." Giannella, supra note 14, 
at 520. 
70. In Nyquist, Justice Powell commented on the extreme situation where a tuition 
grant is deliberately used as an incentive: "[I]f the grants are offered as an incentive to 
parents to send their children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted cash pay-
ments to them, the Establishment Clause is violated •.•• " 413 U.S. at 786. 
71. Kauper, supra note 30, at 347. 
72. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971). 
73. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). 
74. "But whatever may be the weight and contours of entanglement as a separate 
constitutional criterion, it is of remote relevance in the case before us with respect to 
the validity of tuition grants or ta.x credits involving or requiring no relationships what-
soever between the State and any church or any church school." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 
822 (White, J., dissenting). Furthermore, in Nyquist, the Court gave no indication that 
the financing involved in the New York programs constituted unconstitutional entangle-
ment in the sense that there was too great a continuing relationship between church 
and state. However, Justice Powell indicated that the New York programs carried a 
"grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over 
aid to religion." 413 U.S. at 794. ' 
75. See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 794. 
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strife would be aggravated both by the need for continuing annual 
appropriations and by the likelihood of demands for larger appropri-
ations as costs and population grow.70 Justice Powell's "direct-aid" 
test may have reflected this concern; since the test did not reflect 
economic reality,77 it may have rested on the public's psychological 
reaction to direct aid.78 That is, the directness of the aid given may 
be one measurement of the psychological reaction that aid to a secu-
lar function will arouse in those who receive no benefits; nonbe-
lievers may resent and take political action against aid to believers 
if, because the secular functions aided are not clearly separated from 
sectarian functions, they suspect that religious activities of the be-
lievers are aided. 
Under a full voucher system, fears of political partisanship and 
resentment along religious lines would not be warranted. A full 
voucher system would not cause annual interreligious strife about 
school appropriations because an increase in appropriations for 
vouchers that could be used for sectarian schools would mean that 
appropriations for vouchers to be used for secular schools would also 
be increased, and vice versa. Thus, any political division over the 
amounts to be appropriated for the voucher system would be along 
lines other than religion. 
Nor should the fact that the aid provided through a full voucher 
system seems to be as direct as that provided in Nyquist cause the 
resentment feared by Justice Powell. There should be less re-
sentment if believers and nonbelievers receive the same form and 
degree of aid and all have comparable opportunities to send their 
children to schools that suit their tastes. Thus, if political resentment 
76. 413 U.S. !1t 795-98. 
77. See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra. 
78. "Directness" may refer to how the aid is labeled: If it is labeled "for bus fares," 
it may be considered to be directly aiding a secular functipn; llowever, if it is labeled 
"for education," it may be said to be aiding a sectarian function, because education in 
parochial schools is partially a sectarian function. However, this distinction is not coll• 
elusive, because the economic aid in Walz was labeled "for church property" and was 
upheld, even though church property is, by definition, used for sectarian purposes. 
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania and New York legislatures intended the aid they gave 
to be labeled "for secular education." 
A more convincing use of the direct-aid test is to require not only that the aid be 
labeled for a secular function (for example, for bus fares), but also that it be provided 
for a function that is "indisputably marked off from the religious function." Everson v. 
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 18 (1947). Aid labeled "for secular education" would not 
satisfy this latter requirement, if, for instance, it were used to pay salaries for teachers 
or to pay for the maintenance of buildings in which both secular and sectarian subjects 
were taught. In those cases, a state could not be certain that the sectarian school would 
sufficiently separate the normally intertwined secular and sectarian functions, Nyquist, 
413 U.S. at 778-79, unless the state engaged in such surveillance of the school as to 
cause excessive entanglement. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971). 
This last interpretation of the direct-aid test is probably the interpretation that 
Justice Powell meant to adopt, even though, again, it fails to distinguish Walz. 
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based on religious divisions is to be avoided, a test based on the 
special-footing distinction should be more useful than one based on 
the direct-aid distinction. 
There are, however, ways in which a voucher system could breed 
division and resentment. For example, if, under the system as im-
plemented, most children were to attend schools that cater to narrow 
groups defined along religious or class lines, the potential for inter-
group fear and dislike could be enormous. Another potential prob-
lem would arise if the schools of a few denominations or groups 
were greatly superior to those of other denominations; in that situa-
tion, the members of one group might resent the other groups or 
feel compelled to send their children to sectarian schools that teach 
doctrines they do not accept in order to give their children a good 
education. These possibilities cannot be ignored, but they are only 
possibilities, and the states should be allowed to experiment with 
voucher programs until they prove to be real problems.79 
Although it is not grounded in the first amendment, the state's 
desire to improve its educational programs should also be considered 
in assessing the validity of voucher systems.80 State autonomy in the 
area of school financing should be and is encouraged, because of the 
complexities of financing and the importance of education to the 
citizenry. To refuse to allow a state to experiment with a full 
voucher system would constitute an extraordinary intrusion of the 
federal judiciary into the state's control over its educational system. 
On balance, state experimentation with full voucher systems 
should be permitted. If it becomes apparent after a system has been 
fully implemented that it does not provide educational alternatives 
for the general public but only benefits the religious groups now 
served by parochial schools, judicial intervention may then be 
appropriate. 
II. A PARTIAL VOUCHER SYSTEM 
In September 1974, New Hampshire will begin a pilot partial 
voucher system. Under this program, as many as 8,000 students will 
be able to choose to attend any nonsectarian, private, accredited 
school, with assistance from the government, or to attend any public 
school in their district.81 Not surprisingly, a Roman Catholic group 
has threatened suit to block implementation of the system.82 
Commentators83 have suggested, with little discussion, that a 
79. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973). 
80. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973). 
81. See text accompanying note 8 supra. 
82. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1973, § I, at 64, col. I (late city ed.). 
83. See Areen, supra note 2, at 492; Note, Education Vouchers: The Fruit of the 
Lemon Tree, 24 STAN. L. REv. 687, 689-90 (1972). 
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voucher plan like that to be adopted by New Hampshire would 
violate the first amendment by imposing a burden on the free exer-
cise of religion by parents who believe that their children should be 
educated in religious schools, for they must choose either to follow 
their religious beliefs and forgo a benefit available to everyone else 
or to ignore their beliefs and receive the benefit.81 
This burden might be justified if a voucher system that included 
sectarian schools violated the first amendment's prohibition on di-
rect aid to secular schools. In that case, the institution of a partial 
system would be the only way in which a state could experiment 
with the voucher system of financing education. However, as this 
Note has indicated, it does not appear that a full voucher system 
would violate the first amendment. 
The state may also argue that the competing first amendment 
values are so well balanced in this situation that the system falls 
within that zone of discretion in which a state can establish what in 
its judgment is a proper reconciliation of competing first amendment 
interests. 
If the state cannot put forward persuasive reasons why the ex-
clusion of sectarian schools from the voucher system does not im-
permissibly burden the free exercise of religion, then the state must 
adopt a full voucher system, as a required accommodation to re-
ligious interests, if it wishes to adopt any system at all. However, 
it is unlikely that an accommodation involving the grant of financial 
aid to religious institutions will be required. While political units 
have, in some cases, been permitted to give aid to sectarian institu-
tions, 85 the cases in which they have been required to do so are very 
rare.86 Two state supreme court decisions have, however, imposed 
84. In Board of Education v. Allen, appellee Allen argued that the parents of a 
child attending a sectarian school would be faced with such a dilemma if the child 
were not allowed to receive secular textbooks from the state, since children attending 
nonsectarian schools did receive such books. Brief for Appellee Allen at 39, Board of 
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). While the Court upheld the te.xtbook program, it 
did not discuss this issue. Cf. discussion of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (196!1), in 
text accompanying note 104 infra. 
85. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 
664 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 
U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, the Court said, "[W]e do not mean to intimate that a state 
could not provide transportation only to children attending public schools , • • ," 330 
U.S. at 16. In Walz, the Court spoke of "permissible state accommodation to religion," 
397 U.S. at 673 (emphasis added). 
86. While it has been suggested that property ta.x exemptions for church property 
could be found to be a required accommodation, Note, Constitutionality of State Prop-
erty Tax Exemptions for Religious Property, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 118, 133.34 (1971), the 
Walz decision clearly did not encompass such a finding. Similarly, in Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971), the Court indicated that its task is to "perceive the bound-
aries of permissible government activity" (emphasis added). While Board of Educ. v. 
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), contains no explicit language to the effect that the accom-
modation is merely permitted, it seems clear that it docs not require a state to lend 
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such a requirement. In State ex rel. Hughes v. Board of Education,81 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that county 
boards of education that provided transportation to and from public 
schools violat~d the first amendment by denying such transportation 
to children attending parochial schools. The Michigan Supreme 
Court reached a similar result in Traverse City School District v. 
Attorney General,88 which ruled that the religion clauses of the first 
amendment require that students attending private sectarian schools 
be allowed access to shared-time instruction and auxiliary services 
available to public school students.89 The court in Hughes merely 
stated its conclusion that the accommodation was required.90 The 
court in Traverse City, however, reasoned that the denial to sectarian 
school students of access to the services available to public school 
students imposed a burden on the free exercise of religion; the im-
position of this burden was found to be unconstitutional because it 
was not justified by a compelling state interest. 91 
textbooks to private schools. In Leutkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 42 U.S.L.W. 2189 (\V.D. Mo., 
Sept. 24, 1973) (three-judge court), the court decided that the Missouri statutes that 
provided for transportation of public school pupils to and from school but did not 
provide like transportation for pupils at church-related schools did not unconstitution-
ally deny nonpublic school students the equal protection of the laws. 
87. -W. Va.-, 174 S.E.2d 711 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 944 (1971). 
88. 384 Mich. 390, 185 N.W.2d 9 (1971). 
89. 384 Mich. at 431-34, 185 N.W.2d at 27-29. In 64th St. Residences, Inc. v. City of 
New York, 4 N.Y.2d 268, 276, 150 N.E.2d 396, 399, 174 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5, cert. denied, 357 
U.S. 907 (1958), the New York Court of Appeals, while upholding the constitutionality 
of a sale of public land to a sectarian university, suggested that the university would 
have been deprived of its constitutional rights if it alone had been excluded from 
bidding. 
It has also been suggested that it would be possible to argue that the constitutional 
provisions of Virginia and West Virginia, which prohibit the incorporation of churches 
but allow the incorporation of other nonprofit institutions, violate the free exercise 
clause. Kauper 8: Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 71 Mica. L. R.Ev. 1499, 
1564-65 (19'73). 
90. - W. Va. at-, 174 S.E.2d at 719. 
91. 384 Mich. at 433, 185 N.W .2d at 28-29. 
The approach in Hughes and Traverse City is also found in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), two cases that illustrate 
the Supreme Court's method of determining when an accommodation that consists of 
preferential treatment of religious interests is required. In Sherbert, the Court ruled 
that the denial of unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist because she re-
fused to work on Saturday and was thus unable to find a job burdened her free exer-
cise of religion. While the statute in question-S.C. CoDE .ANN. § 64--4 (1962), as amended, 
S.C. CODE .ANN. § 64--4 (Supp. 1973), which specifically prohibited the firing of textile 
plant employees who refuse to work on Sunday-did not, on its face, classify people 
on the basis of religion, its effect was to force the plaintiff to choose between follo'jVing 
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting unemployment benefits, on the one hand, 
and disobeying such precepts and receiving the benefits, on the other. 374 U.S. at 404. 
The conflict in Sherbert was between the interest in allowing the voluntary practice 
of religion and the fear of giving preferential treatment to religion. The Court resolved 
this conflict in favor of the voluntary practice of religion, because such practice would 
have been greatly impaired by the denial of unemployment benefits, while the granting 
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However, most other decisions have not required that economic 
aid be extended equally to sectarian and nonsectarian schools. For 
example, in Brusca v. State of Missouri ex rel. State Board of Edu-
cation, 92 a three-judge federal court in Missouri held that the pro-
visions of the Missouri constitution that established a free public 
school system but prohibited the use of public funds to aid sectarian 
schools directly or indirectly did not violate the free exercise clause 
of the first amendment. 
Dicta in several United States Supreme Court cases indicate 
that states that adopt a voucher system may not be required to in-
clude sectarian schools. One such case was Norwood v. Harrison.03 
The question was whether Mississippi could lend textbooks to stu-
dents in public and private schools without regard to whether any 
participating private school had a racially discriminatory policy. 
Mississippi argued that, since a state could not prohibit parents from 
educating their children at private schools,04 it would be a denial of 
equal protection to discriminate against children of parents who 
exercised this constitutionally protected choice by denying them 
textbooks.95 The Court pointed out that states have never been 
required to aid private schools. 96 Furthermore, the Court said, 
"Even assuming . . . that the Equal Protection Clause might re-
quire state aid to be granted to private nonsectarian schools in some 
circumstances . . . a State could rationally conclude as a matter of 
legislative policy that constitutional neutrality as to sectarian schools 
might best be achieved by withholding all state assistance."07 
In Sloan, Justice Powell made a similar point. The appellants 
ingeniously asked the Court to declare the provisions of the Pennsyl-
vania statute severable and thereby allow tuition reimbursements 
of benefits would, in comparison, not further the interests of the religion in question 
to any great extent. In addition, this resolution would not appear to create strife be-
tween religious factions. The Court's approach could also be interpreted as giving addi-
tional weight to the free exercise interest. 
The Court in Yoder found that Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law, which 
required a child to attend school until he reached the age of 16, violated the free excr• 
cise right of the Amish, who had declined to send their children to public or private 
schools after they had completed the eighth grade. The Court considered both the 
state's interest in requiring the Amish children to attend an extra year or two of school 
and the value of parental discretion in the religious upbringing and education of 
children. As in Sherbert, the interest in allowing freedom of belief overcame the in-
terest in prohibiting governmental encouragement of religion. 
92. 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971), affd. without opinion, 405 U.S. 1050 (1072). 
93. 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973). 
94. See 413 U.S. at 461, citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
95. 413 U.S. at 461-62. 
96. 413 U.S. at 462. Norwood was used as precedent on this point in Leutkemeyer v. 
Kaufmann, 42 U.S.L.W. 2189 (W.D. Mo., Sept. 24, 1973) (three-judge court}, Leutlie• 
meyer is described at note 86 supra. 
97. 413 U.S. at 462. 
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for parents of children attending private schools that were not 
church-related. 98 Then, the appellants argued, if the parents of chil-
dren who attended nonsectarian private schools received assistance, 
the parents of children who attended sectarian schools were entitled 
to the same aid as a matter of equal protection, and the aid should 
be reinstated.99 The Court properly rejected this argument as "thor-
oughly spurious."10° First, it found that the aid to nonsectarian 
schools could not be severed from the aid to sectarian schools.101 
More significantly, it said that, "[ e ]ven if the Act were clearly sev-
erable, valid aid to nonpublic, nonsectarian schools would provide 
no lever for aid to their sectarian counterparts."102 
Thus, while a state may, on occasion, be required to aid a sec-
tarian institution, cases in which that result is reached are rare in-
deed. To determine whether a voucher system of the New Hamp-
shire type presents one of the rare cases in which a state will be 
required to aid a sectarian institution, it is necessary, once more, to 
look to the purposes of the religion clauses of the first amendment. 
The New Hampshire system is suspect under the religious free-
dom aspect of voluntarism. A system that funds private secular 
schools but not private sectarian schools places an extra burden on 
those who believe that religion must be an integral part of educa-
tion. But, arguably, the New Hampshire system does nothing less 
than the present public school system. Both support only secular 
schools. The difference may be only one of appearances. Under the 
existing system, everyone seems to be treated equally, possibly be-
cause the focus is on the public schools, which are open to all. Un-
der a system like New Hampshire's, the focus may be on the dis-
parate treatment of those desiring to use vouchers at private 
sectarian schools. The difference between the two systems is an 
emotive one but, nonetheless, may be significant.103 
If the free exercise of religion would be burdened by a system 
like New Hampshire's, it is still necessary to determine the relative 
impact of the burden. In Sherbert v. Verner,104 the Court found 
98. 413 U.S. at 834. 
99. See 413 U.S. at 834. 
100. 413 U.S. at 834. 
101. 413 U.S. at 834. 
102. 413 U.S. at 834. 
103. This psychological impact problem, which results from lack of uniform treat-
ment of believers and nonbelievers, may help explain some of the attractiveness of Pro-
fessor Kurland's. strict neutrality theory, which would prohibit the government from 
classifying groups on the basis of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a 
burden. Such a rule would permit a classification in terms of public or nonpublic 
schools but not in terms of sectarian and nonsectarian schools. See text accompanying 
note 12 supra. 
104. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
914 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:895 
that the denial of unemployment benefits to Sherbert, a Seventh Day 
Adventist, because she refused to work on Saturday and was thus 
unable to find a job burdened her free exercise of religion. The 
Court resolved the case in favor of Sherbert because the voluntary 
practice of religion would have been greatly impaired by the denial 
of unemployment benefits, while the granting of benefits would, in 
comparison, not further the interest of the religion in question to 
any great extent. The pressure on Sherbert to forgo her religious 
practice was obviously great, for, unless she acted contrary to the 
tenets of her religion, her only source of income would be termi-
nated. In contrast, the burden suffered by the parent who wishes 
to send his child to a sectarian school but who is not given any state 
financial assistance for that purpose may not be nearly so great. In 
most cases, the only burden will be that the parent, rather than the 
government, must pay the child's tuition. Less wealthy parents will 
have to rely on scholarships. Even if scholarships are not available, 
the worst that will befall the parent will be that he will be forced 
to send his c_hild to a public school. He would still be able to sup-
plement his child's secular education with less expensive part-time 
religious training or training at home. 
A voucher system like New Hampshire's would be consistent 
with the other aspect of voluntarism, that the tmces of the people 
should not be used to support the religious beliefs of others,10u be-
cause it does not fund instruction at religious institutions. The 
Sherbert decision may be contrary to this policy, but the kind of 
support required by Sherbert is minor compared to the support that 
would be provided by including sectarian schools in a voucher sys-
tem. The Sherbert Court required taxpayers to accommodate re-
ligious interests by paying unemployment benefits to a relatively 
small number of people who would not othenvise have received 
such benefits. A decision requiring that sectarian schools be included 
in a voucher system would greatly increase school taxes.100 
The most obvious problem wit!J. the New Hampshire system is 
that it will heighten political strife. Because schools will be classified 
on the basis of whether they are sectarian or nonsectarian, rather 
than on the basis of whether they are public or nonpublic, there 
·will be a clear appearance of discrimination, which may lead to in-
creased religious antagonism. The first inklings of such antagonism 
can already be seen in the suit by New Hampshire Catholics to 
block the forthcoming experiment.107 
105. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra. 
106. In the United States, in 1972, there were 4.37 million pupils in some 12,000 
Roman Catholic elementary and secondary schools. There were also some 6,000 elemen-
tary and secondary schools related to other faiths. The taxpayers do not at present fund 
these schools. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 816 (White, J., dissenting). 
107. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1973, § 1, at 64, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
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This political antagonism could be chronic. Every time the state 
legislature appropriated funds for the voucher system, the antago-
nism would rise again. Of course, the antagonism is probably not 
much greater than that now existing under a system that gives sup-
porters of sectarian schools no direct benefit from appropriations for 
education. 
Again, another factor that a court should consider in determining 
whether it should require a state to make further accommodations 
to religious interests is the amount of discretion that a state should 
have in experimenting with methods of educational :financing. Be-
cause of the great importance of education, such state experimenta-
tion seems desirable and necessary. In addition, where the compet-
ing first amendment interests are difficult to reconcile, the states 
should have discretion in developing a workable solution to a prob-
lem that contains many unknowns.108 A partial voucher system does 
have the appearance of discrimination; does burden the free exercise 
of religion, albeit in a manner similar to the present financing sys-
tem; and does heighten the possibility of political strife along re-
ligious lines. A system like New Hampshire's, however, does not 
differ substantially from the present public school financing sys-
tem and does not burden the free exercise of religion excessively. 
In addition, the first amendment contains a strong policy against 
state aid to sectarian institutions, so that, while aid may be -per-
mitted, it is not likely to be required. On balance, the states should 
be permitted to experiment with the partial, as well as with the 
full, voucher system. 
108. See note 19 supra. 
